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# Our Colossal Failure In Moscow

It is not yet clear when the trials of Marine Sgt. Clayton Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy will begin, or whether one of them will be offered immunity in exchange for testimony, or how many people will eventually be implicated in the still-spreading embassy scandal.

Investigation continues of the Marine guards in Moscow, and into lax State Department attitudes and practices. Recriminations are still spreading. "The Marines have been difficult all the time," said Arthur Hartman, who served as U.S. ambassador to Moscow during the alleged espionage. Unnamed Marine spokesmen are complaining of indifferent, incompetent State Department management. And Soviet spokesmen invite us to laugh it all off. "I thought the fear was of reds *under* every bed," said Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov.

Meanwhile, investigative reporters of our adversarial media seem less interested than they might be in these problems, despite the presence of all the ingredients of a big-time scandal—national security, sex, spies, bureaucratic bungling and far more money than in the Iran-contra case. So far, the Moscow scandals lack the political sex appeal required to keep an issue in the media's focus for long.

Before the whole multilayered affair is swept off the news pages, it is useful to reflect on who is responsible for this colossal failure of security and loyalty in Moscow and possibly elsewhere.

My answer to "Who's to blame?" includes the following:

First, the Marine Corps, for sending young men of doubtful strength of character to Moscow and failing to provide adequate supervision and discipline.

Doubtless, the temptations in Moscow are extraordinary, the women beautiful, the entrapment exquisitely planned and executed, the State Department jealous of its rights. Still, the Marine Corps should obviously have been more discerning and more vigilant. Who can doubt it?

Second, the Department of State, including the former ambassador, his deputy, the chief of security and various intervening layers of diplomatic officers, for claiming the right to manage security in embassies and failing to fulfill the attendant obligations. The State Department claims control of these matters on the grounds that its officers best understand foreign environments and the requirements of functioning in them. Presumably, this includes a reasonably accurate assessment of the kind and amount of resources the KGB devotes to infiltrating U.S. embassies.

The Marine case is only the most recent and dramatic evidence of the State Department's inadequate concern with providing minimum security for U.S. operations in Moscow (and various other posts). Employing Soviet nationals, including known KGB agents, inside the embassy is another example of the State Department's pattern of unconcern with security. Accepting a major Soviet role in constructing the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow is yet another indicator of passive attitudes toward Soviet penetration. The low-key reaction to Soviet bugging of U.S. typewriters in the Moscow embassy is yet another example—one which contrasts sharply with the French response.

As Marine commanders clearly underestimated the importance of discipline and discreet behavior by Marine guards, on and off duty, State Department officers have come too easily to tolerate widespread Soviet and Soviet-bloc spying as an inevitable fact of life in international affairs. This is why scores of known Soviet and Soviet-bloc spies have been tolerated in and around the United Nations in New York. It is why State resisted imposing travel restrictions on Soviet and Soviet-bloc diplomatic personnel associated with the U.N.

Third, we the people—and our schools—must share the blame for young Americans whose education did not give them a full understanding of the value of democratic institutions, the obligations of democratic citizenship, and the vast moral difference between free and unfree societies. The same issue of The Washington Post that featured Marine spying reported a "consensus" of school superintendents meeting in the nation's capital on the need for greater stress on democratic values and civic education. "The consensus is that schools should impart civic virtue and take clear positions on right and wrong behavior and personal morality . . ." said California Superintendent of Schools William Honig. "We have not done a good job in the last 15 years in teaching values."

However, the fact that everyone shares in the blame for eroding standards of loyalty does not mean we are all equally at fault.

The responsibility for admitting KGB agents into secure areas of the U.S. Embassy lies finally with those who did just that. Inadequate discipline, supervision and vigilance constitute one kind of failing. They neither excuse nor explain the betrayal of one's country to a potential adversary.

Socializing, fraternizing with Soviet women is one kind of infraction—more dangerous perhaps than is readily understood. But giving KGB agents access to American communications and codes is quite another.

It is terribly important that we not join Soviet spokesmen who invite us to laugh off betrayal. Conspiring to betray one's country and collaborating with its most powerful, most dangerous potential adversary is not to be dismissed as one more proof that boys will be boys.

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